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Abstract
This paper examines the balanced-growth maximizing public investment
policy in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are pri-
vate R&D and public capital accumulation. The government allocates tax
revenue between new investment and maintenance expenditure for public
capital. We consider how the balanced-growth maximizing public invest-
ment policy changes as patent protection becomes stronger, as seen in many
countries. The results show that as patent protection becomes stronger, the
income tax rate to finance public investment should be lower and the ex-
penditure share of new investment should be higher. The balanced-growth
maximizing policy leads to a smaller government, as patent protection be-
comes stronger.
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1 Introduction
One of the important changes that have significantly impacted the operating envi-
ronments of firms in many countries is the recent strengthening of the protection
of intellectual property rights, including patents. Figure 1 plots an index of patent
rights on a scale of 0-5 provided by Park (2008) and shows that the strength of
patent rights in all G7 countries has increased since the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of 1994.12 It is widely believed
that stronger patent protection enables the patent holders to obtain a higher rent by
charging a higher price. In turn, it is likely that this process promotes innovation,
thereby increasing productivity and economic growth.3 On the other hand, many
empirical studies indicate that publicly-provided infrastructure service plays a key
role in sustained growth. As discussed in Age´nor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and
Age´nor and Neanidis (2015), productive government activities, such as building
new infrastructures and extending the durability of existing infrastructures through
maintenance activities, exert a strong positive impact on the productivity of private
inputs, promote private investment, including R&D, and this increases economic
growth. These complementary relationships among publicly-provided infrastruc-
ture, strength of patent protection and economic growth suggest that the growth
implications of public investment policy depend heavily upon the degree of patent
protection.
Motivated by these recent changes in the protection of intellectual property
rights, this paper incorporates productive public capital into a variety expansion
type R&D-based growth model and examines how stronger patent protection al-
ters the government’s public investment policy whose objective is to maximize
the balanced-growth rate (i.e., the long-run growth rate) of the economy. Then,
we show that as patent protection becomes stronger, the income tax rate to finance
public investment should be lower and the expenditure share of new investment
should be higher. The balanced-growth maximizing policy leads to a smaller gov-
ernment, as patent protection becomes stronger. To the best of our knowledge,
existing studies have yet to analyze these issues rigorously.
Figure 2 plots the GDP share of the general government gross capital forma-
tion in G7 countries.4 The balanced-growth maximizing policy indicates that the
1Park (2008) examines five categories of patent rights (patent duration, coverage, enforcement
mechanism, restrictions on patent scope, and membership in international treaties) and assigns a
score from 0 to 1. A larger number implies stronger protection.
2G7 countries accounted for 84 percent of worldwide R&D spending in 1995 (Keller, 2009)
and have presumably pushed the world ’s technology frontier.
3This may not be the case if we consider sequential innovation. In this case, stronger patent
protection may impede sequential innovation. See Chu et al. (2012a) for example.
4The 2019 OECD economic outlook is used to calculate the GDP share of the general govern-
ment gross capital formation.
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tax rate to finance public investment becomes lower as patent protection becomes
stronger. This result indicates that the GDP share of public investment becomes
lower as patent protection becomes stronger. However, Figure 2 shows that, ex-
cept for Japan, the GDP share of public investment in most G7 countries has
no clear downward trend during which the degree of patent protection becomes
stronger. Consequently, the actual trends in public capital investment do not match
the prediction obtained from the balanced-growth maximizing public investment
policy.
Many authors have studied how publicly-provided infrastructure contributes to
economic growth, both theoretically and empirically.5 In endogenous growth set-
tings, Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Futagami et al. (1993) and
Turnovsky (1997), among others, theoretically investigate the balanced-growth
maximizing and the optimal public investment policy, taking the infrastructure as
a flow or a stock. In their studies, they assume that infrastructure improves la-
bor productivity and show that the growth maximizing income tax rate to finance
public investment is equal to the elasticity of public capital in the production.
Recently, Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) have focused on the maintenance ac-
tivities of government and shown that the growth maximizing income tax rate to
finance public investment is greater than the elasticity of public capital in produc-
tion when taking into account a trade-off in the allocation of tax revenue between
new investment and maintenance expenditure. In their model, new government
investments accumulate public capital in a one-to-one manner, while maintenance
expenditures reduce the depreciation rate of public capital. Dioikitopoulos and
Kalyvitis (2008) have extended Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004)’s model by in-
corporating the congestion of public capital and shown that the optimal income tax
rate to finance public investment is positively related to the degree of congestion.6
By employing a two-period overlapping generations version of Kalaitzidakis and
Kalyvitis (2004)’s model, Yakita (2008) has examined the effect of population ag-
ing on balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy and shown that as
aging proceeds, not only should the income tax rate to finance public investment
be higher but also the expenditure share of maintenance activities.
In line with Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), our study assumes that the
government allocates the tax revenue between new investment and maintenance
expenditure. In economies with substantial stocks of accumulated capital, as in
developed countries, the role of maintenance and replacement investment will
become more important, as pointed out by Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004)
and Yakita (2008). Moreover, in order to make our results comparable to those
5See Age´nor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) for a more comprehensive literature review.
6Age´nor (2009) proposes alternative model that examines the growth and welfare implications
of maintenance expenditure. In his paper, maintenance spending affects both the durability and
the efficiency of public capital.
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of Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) and Yakita (2008), we assume that the
government chooses the income tax rate and the allocation ratio between new
investment and maintenance expenditure, so as to maximize the balanced-growth
rate. However, in contrast to these existing studies, we employ a R&D-based
growth model and analyze the relationship between the degree of patent protection
and the growth maximizing public investment policy.7
This paper also relates to studies that examined the growth and welfare im-
plications of fiscal policy in an R&D-based growth model.8 Among them, this
paper relates most closely to Iwaisako (2013) and Iwaisako (2016). Iwaisako
(2013) examines the optimal degree of patent protection in a variety expansion
type R&D-based growth model with productive public services and shows that as
public service becomes smaller, the optimal level of patent protection is weaker.
Similar to Iwaisako (2013), our study concerns the complementary relationships
among publicly-provided infrastructure, strength of patent protection and eco-
nomic growth. However, our study focuses on the analysis of the growth max-
imizing public investment policy. Moreover, since Iwaisako (2013) ignores the
maintenance activities of government, the growth maximizing income tax rate to
finance public investment is equal to the elasticity of public capital in produc-
tion and is independent of the degree of patent protection. Therefore, this study
proposes a novel framework to analyze the relationship between the degree of
patent protection and the growth maximizing public investment policy. Moreover,
Iwaisako (2016) examines the optimal corporate income tax and consumption tax
rates in a quality ladder type R&D-based growth model and shows that as patent
protection becomes stronger, the corporate tax rate should be higher and the con-
sumption tax rate should be lower. Our study shares numerous research interests
with Iwaisako (2016). However, our study considers productive public capital ex-
plicitly and focuses its analyses on the properties of the growth maximizing public
investment policy. In this sense, this paper complements the analysis conducted
by Iwaisako (2016).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3 derives the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy and examines
the effect of patent protection on balanced-growth maximizing public investment
policy. Section 4 briefly considers the welfare-maximizing public investment pol-
icy. Section 5 concludes the paper.
7In analyzing the properties of the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy,
Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) and Yakita (2008) did not consider the second-order suf-
ficient condition to be a relative maximum explicitly. This may be one of the reasons why these
studies exhibit many ambiguous results in their comparative static analyses. Explicit consideration
of the second-order sufficient condition may be a minor contribution of this paper.
8See Iwaisako (2016) for a more comprehensive literature review.
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2 Model
To analyze the effect of patent protection on balanced-growth maximizing public
investment policy, we introduce productive public capital into a variety expansion
type R&D-based growth model following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). For
production, there are three sectors: a final goods sector, an intermediate goods
sector, and an R&D sector. The government imposes taxes on labor and corpo-
rate income and allocates tax revenue between new investment and maintenance
expenditure for public capital. In accordance with Goh and Olivier (2002), we
introduce patent breadth into the model.
2.1 Household
There is a unit continuum of identical households. The population size of each
household is given by L, which is assumed to be constant over time. Each member
of households supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The lifetime utility of a
household is given by:
U =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σt − 1
1 − σ Le
−ρtdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0, (1)
where ct is the level of per capita consumption, ρ is the subjective discount rate,
and σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We assume that
labor income is taxed at rate τ ∈ (0, 1). The household supplies L units of labors to
earn wages and makes consumption-saving decisions to maximize lifetime utility
subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
A˙t = rtAt + (1 − τ)wtL − ctL, (2)
where At is the real value of assets, rt is the real interest rate, wt is the real wage
rate, and τ is the tax rate on wage income. As in Grossman and Helpman (1991),
all assets are held in the form of the shares of monopolistic firms. From standard
dynamic optimization, the Eular equation is given by
c˙t
ct
=
1
σ
(rt − ρ) . (3)
In addition, the following transversality condition holds:
lim
t→∞ c
−σ
t Ate
−ρt = 0.
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2.2 Final Goods Sector
The final goods Yt are produced by perfectly competitive firms using the following
technology:
Yt = AL1−αY,t
∫ Nt
0
(
htxi,t
)α di, A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), (4)
where
ht = GϵtN
1−ϵ
t , ϵ ∈ (0, 1), (5)
A > 0 is a productivity parameter, LY,t is labor input in the final goods sector, xi,t is
the input of intermediate good i, Nt is the number of intermediate goods, andGt is
the aggregate stock of public capital. Following Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012),
the composite externality ht represents a combination of the role of knowledge
spillover from the existing stock of variety Nt, as in Benassy (1998), together
with productive public capital services Gt, as in Barro (1990).9 The government
can increase the productivity of private firms by providing public capital services.
Under these specifications, the output elasticity of public capital is given by αϵ,
whereas the price elasticity of intermediate goods is given by 11−α .
10 We take the
final output as numeraire.
Given the price of the intermediate goods pi,t and wage rate wt, the profit
maximization yields
wt = (1 − α) YtLY,t , (6)
pi,t = αAL1−αY,t h
α
t x
α−1
i,t . (7)
2.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
There is a continuum of intermediate goods i ∈ [0,Nt]. One unit of intermedi-
ate goods is produced with one unit of labor. A single firm holding the patent
monopolistically supplies each intermediate good i. The profit function of each
intermediate good firm is pii,t =
(
pi,t − wt) xi,t. The familiar unconstrained profit-
maximizing price is pi,t = wtα . Here we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to introduce
9More precisely, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) consider the composite externality from
physical capital, as in Romer (1986), and productive public spending, as in Barro (1990), and
conduct numerical analyses including growth and welfare effects. Our application of (5) is in line
with Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012), because in our model, the stock of Nt replaces the role
of physical capital (i.e., the engine of economic growth and the source of spillover). Since the
pioneering work by Romer (1986), the positive social returns to variety have been applied in many
R&D-based growth models (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Benassy, 1998; Perretto, 2007).
10The main implications of this paper do not change qualitatively even if we consider the case
where there is no knowledge spillover from the existing stock of variety (i.e., ϵ = 1).
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patent breadth β > 1 as a policy variable, such that pi,t = max
{
β, 1
α
}
wt.11 We focus
on the interesting case in which β ∈ (1, 1
α
). Consequently, a broader patent breadth
β enables the monopolistic firms to charge a higher markup capturing Gilbert and
Shapiro’s (1990) seminal insight on “breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise
price”.12 Substituting pi,t = pt = βwt into (7) and pii,t =
(
pi,t − wt) xi,t shows that
the relations xi,t = xt and pii,t = pit for all i ∈ [0,Nt]. Therefore, henceforth, we can
omit the index i. Under these specifications, the profit of each intermediate good
firm satisfies
pit =
β − 1
β
ptxt =
β − 1
β
αYt
Nt
, (8)
where the second equality follows from (7) and Yt = AL1−αY,t Nt (htxt)
α. Moreover,
substituting pt = βwt and (6) into (8) yields
xt =
(α/β)
1 − α
LY,t
Nt
. (9)
2.4 R&D Sector
Denote Vi,t as the value of the patent on variety i ∈ [0,Nt]. pii,t = pit from (8)
implies that Vi,t = Vt for all i ∈ [0,Nt]. Here, we assume that the profit of firms
is taxed at rate τ ∈ (0, 1). If households possess one unit of stock in the time
interval dt, they can obtain a profit of (1 − τ)pit and a capital gain or loss of V˙t.
Alternatively, they can invest Vt units of funds in the risk-free asset. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition for Vt is
rtVt = (1 − τ)pit + V˙t. (10)
Competitive entrepreneurs employ R&D inputs for innovation. In accordance
with Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we consider the lab equipment type R&D
specification. Devoting a units of the final good, R&D firms can invent one unit
of intermediate goods. Given the value of the patent on variety Vt, the zero profit
condition yields
Vt = a. (11)
Combining (8), (10) and (11) yields rt = 1−τa
β−1
β
αYt
Nt
.
11Generally, governments control the degree of patent protection through patent length and
breadth. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that the patent length is fixed and infinite and that
governments control the degree of patent protection using only patent breadth.
12Specifically, we assume that the broader the government makes patent breadth, the more dif-
ficult it is to produce imitative goods. We specify the unit cost of producing imitative goods as
βwt. Each firm that produces an intermediate good charges a price such that producers of imitative
goods cannot earn positive profits, as follows: pi,t = βwt.
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2.5 Government
The government imposes taxes on labor and corporate income at the constant tax
rate τ ∈ (0, 1), and allocates tax revenue between new investment and mainte-
nance expenditure for public capital. Denoting new investment and maintenance
expenditure by IG,t and IM,t, respectively, the budget constraint of the government
can be written as
IG,t + IM,t = τ (wtL + pitNt) = τYt, (12)
where the second equality follows from (6), (7), (15) and pit = (pt − wt)xt.13 The
tax rate τ can be interpreted as the share of output allocated to public expenditure
(i.e., the size of government). Denoting the expenditure share of new investment
as λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
IG,t = λτYt, IM,t = (1 − λ) τYt. (13)
As in Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), we assume that the ratio of the mainte-
nance expenditure to final output reduces the depreciation rate of public capital.
An increase in maintenance expenditure for given aggregate economic activity
reduces the depreciation rate, while a higher economic activity in the economy
for a given maintenance activity accelerates depreciation. The evolution of public
capital stock can be given as
G˙t = IG,t − δ
(
IM,t
Yt
)
Gt, (14)
where δ(·) denotes the depreciation rate function, which is assumed to satisfy the
following conditions: δ(·) ∈ (0, 1), δ′(·) < 0, δ′′(·) > 0, lim IM,t
Yt
→∞
(
IM,t
Yt
)
= δ > 0
and lim IM,t
Yt
→0
(
IM,t
Yt
)
= δ¯ < 1. The higher ratio of maintenance expenditure to final
output reduces the depreciation rate of public capital, but its marginal effect on
the depreciation rate decreases with the ratio of maintenance expenditure to final
output.
2.6 Market Clearing Condition
Labor is demanded by both final goods firms and intermediate goods firms. The
equilibrium condition for the labor market is given as
L = LY,t + Ntxt. (15)
13Combining (6) and (7) yields Yt = wtLY,t + Ntptxt. Using (15) and pit = (pt − wt)xt, this
equation can be rewritten as follows: Yt = wtL+Nt(pt −wt)xt = wtL+Ntpit. Thus, we can confirm
that the relation τ (wtL + pitNt) = τYt holds.
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Combining (9) and (15) yield LY,t = 1−α1−α+(α/β)L and xtNt =
(α/β)
1−α+(α/β)L.
The final goods are used for household consumption, new investment and
maintenance expenditure for public capital and R&D investment. Thus, the fi-
nal goods market clearing condition becomes
Yt = ctL + IG,t + IM,t + aN˙t. (16)
In addition, the asset market clearing condition is given as
At = VtNt.
3 Balanced-growth and Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Equilibrium and Dynamics
The production function of the final goods can be written as Yt = AL1−αY,t Nt (htxt)
α.
Substituting (5), LY,t = 1−α1−α+(α/β)L and xtNt =
(α/β)
1−α+(α/β)L into the production func-
tion, we obtain the final output as follows:
Yt = AGαϵt N
1−αϵ
t Γ(β)L, (17)
where
Γ(β) ≡ (1 − α)
(1−α)(α/β)α
1 − α + (α/β) .
Since Γ′(β) = −α(1−α)(β−1)
β[β(1−α)+α]Γ(β) < 0, we can see that a larger patent breadth neg-
atively affects the volume of production through its distortional effects on labor
allocations.
The dynamic system of the economy for a given patent breadth β is illustrated
by the following equations:
N˙t
Nt
=
L
a
[
(1 − τ)Γ(β)A
(
Gt
Nt
)αϵ
− ct
Nt
]
, (18)
c˙t
ct
=
1
σ
[
L
a
(1 − τ)αA
(
Gt
Nt
)αϵ
β − 1
β
Γ(β) − ρ
]
, (19)
G˙t
Gt
= λτΓ(β)AL
(
Gt
Nt
)αϵ−1
− δ ((1 − λ)τ) , (20)
where (18) is obtained from (12), (16) and (17); (19) is obtained from (3), (17)
and rt = 1−τa
β−1
β
αYt
Nt
; (20) is obtained from (13), (14) and (17), respectively.
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Summarizing equations (18) to (20), we obtain the following dynamic equa-
tions
x˙t =
{
λτΓ(β)ALxαϵ−1t − δ ((1 − λ)τ) −
L
a
[
(1 − τ)Γ(β)Axαϵt − zt
]}
xt, (21)
z˙t =
{
1
σ
[
L
a
(1 − τ)αAxαϵt
β − 1
β
Γ(β) − ρ
]
− L
a
[
(1 − τ)Γ(β)Axαϵt − zt
]}
zt, (22)
where xt ≡ GtNt and zt ≡ ctNt .
3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, from (21) and (22), the relations x˙t = z˙t = 0 hold
(i.e., xt = x and zt = z). Therefore, the per capita consumption, public capital and
the number of intermediate goods grow at the same balanced-growth rate g (i.e.,
c˙t
ct
= G˙tGt =
N˙t
Nt
= g). Noting that the relations g = N˙tNt and x =
Gt
Nt
hold, by solving
(20) for x, we obtain
x =
[
λτΓ(β)AL
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
] 1
1−αϵ
. (20’)
By substituting (20’) into (19), the equilibrium balanced-growth rate g is implic-
itly determined by the following equation:
Ω(g; λ, τ) = λ
αϵ
1−αϵ (LA)
1
1−αϵ
α
a
(1 − τ)τ αϵ1−αϵ Γ(β) 11−αϵ β − 1
β
, (23)
where
Ω(g; λ, τ) ≡ (σg + ρ) [g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)] αϵ1−αϵ ,
Ωg(g; λ, τ) > 0,Ω(0; λ, τ) = ρ [δ ((1 − λ)τ)] αϵ1−αϵ > 0, limg→∞Ω(g; λ, τ) = ∞. Equa-
tion (23) indicates that a unique balanced-growth equilibrium exists, if the pa-
rameter conditions Ω(0; λ, τ) < λ
αϵ
1−αϵ (LA)
1
1−αϵ α
a (1 − τ)τ
αϵ
1−αϵ Γ(β)
1
1−αϵ β−1
β
are satisfied.
Thus, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the parameter conditions
δ ((1 − λ)τ)
λτ
<
[
1
ρ
(LA)
1
1−αϵ
α
a
(1 − τ)Γ(β) 11−αϵ β − 1
β
] 1−αϵ
αϵ
(24)
hold, a unique balanced-growth equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 1 indicates that the two fiscal instruments, τ and λ, are relevant
for the existence of balanced-growth equilibrium. In particular, as underlined
by Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008), the composition of government expendi-
ture may matter for a positive balanced-growth rate. Given the value of tax rate
τ ∈ (0, 1), suppose that all tax revenues are devoted to maintenance expenditure
(i.e., λ = 0), equation (24) never holds, implying that certain amounts of new
investments are necessary for a positive balanced-growth rate. That is, the condi-
tion λ > λl must hold for a positive balanced-growth rate, where λl ∈ (0, 1) is the
minimum expenditure share of new investments that ensures a positive balanced-
growth rate for a given τ ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, given the value of tax
rate τ ∈ (0, 1), suppose that all tax revenues are devoted to new investments (i.e.,
λ = 1), if the parameter conditions δ(0)
τ
>
[
1
ρ
(LA)
1
1−αϵ α
a (1 − τ)Γ(β)
1
1−αϵ β−1
β
] 1−αϵ
αϵ are
satisfied, equation (24) never holds. In this case, due to the convexity of the depre-
ciation function δ(·), as shown in Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008), the condi-
tions λ ∈ (λl, λu) must hold for a positive balanced-growth rate, where λu ∈ (λl, 1)
is the maximum expenditure share of new investments that ensures a positive
balanced-growth rate for given τ ∈ (0, 1). These results indicate that under cer-
tain parameter conditions, both new investment and maintenance expenditure are
necessary for a positive balanced-growth rate.14 In the following analysis, to clar-
ity our main arguments, we restrict our analyses to the case where the parameter
condition of (24) is satisfied.
3.3 Local Stability
When the balanced-growth rate g is determined uniquely, the associated steady-
state values of (x, z) are also determined uniquely from (18) and (20’). 15 Lin-
earizing (21) and (22) around the balanced-growth equilibrium (x, z), we obtain:x˙tz˙t
 =
−Γ(β)αϵAx
αϵ−1L
{
λτ1−αϵ
αϵ
+ 1−τa x
}
L
a x
−σ−
β−1
β α
σ
z La (1 − τ)Γ(β)αϵAxαϵ−1 La z

xt − xzt − z
 . (25)
Calculating the determinants of this coefficient matrix J, we obtain
detJ = −Γ(β)αϵAxαϵ−1(L
a
)2z
{
λτa
1 − αϵ
αϵ
+
x
σ
β − 1
β
α(1 − τ)
}
< 0
Therefore, one of the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix is positive and the other
is negative, that is, the balanced-growth equilibrium is a saddle point. This means
14See Proposition 1 of Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) for more details.
15Noting that g = N˙tNt =
G˙t
Gt
, x = GtNt and z =
ct
Nt
, we obtain that x =
[
λτΓ(β)AL
g+δ((1−λ)τ)
] 1
1−αϵ from (20’) and
that z = (1 − τ)Γ(β)Axαϵ − agL from (18).
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that there is a one-dimensional stable manifold. Since the initial value of z0 = c0N0
is not predetermined, we can choose a unique initial value of z0 on this stable
manifold for a given initial value of x0 = G0N0 . Thus, as in Futagami et al. (1993),
we can obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When there is a unique balanced-growth equilibrium, a unique
stable path converging to the balanced-growth equilibrium exists.
4 Balanced-Growth Maximizing Public Investment
Policy
In this section, we examine the effects of patent protection on balanced-growth
maximizing public investment policy. We assume that initially, the government
chooses two fiscal instruments, τ and λ, so as to maximize the balanced-growth
rate g, taking the strength of patent protection β as given, and then examines
how the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy changes as patent
protection becomes stronger.
4.1 Income Tax Rate and Expenditure Share
In this subsection, we analyze the balanced-growth maximizing tax rate and ex-
penditure share of new investment. The problem for the government is to choose τ
and λ so as to maximize g for a given β. From (23), we can see that the balanced-
growth rate g depends upon the income tax rate τ, the expenditure share of new
investment λ and the strength of patent protection β (i.e., g = g(λ, τ; β)). There-
fore, by totally differentiating (23) with respect to λ and τ, and rearranging them,
we obtain the following first order conditions:
gλ(τ, λ; β) =
αϵ
1−αϵ
[
1
λ
+
δ′((1−λ)τ)τ
g+δ((1−λ)τ)
]
σ
σg+ρ +
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g+δ((1−λ)τ)
= 0, (26)
gτ(τ, λ; β) =
αϵ
1−αϵ
[
1
τ
− δ′((1−λ)τ)(1−λ)g+δ((1−λ)τ)
]
− 11−τ
σ
σg+ρ +
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g+δ((1−λ)τ)
= 0. (27)
See Appendix A for the deviation of equations (26) and (27). From (23), (26)
and (27), we can see that the balanced-growth maximizing public investment pol-
icy (τ∗, λ∗) and the associated balanced-growth rate g∗ must satisfy the following
conditions:
τ∗ =
αϵ
αϵ + (1 − αϵ)λ∗ , (28)
12
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
g∗ + δ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) = −
1
λ∗τ∗
, (29)
Ω(g∗; λ∗, τ∗) = λ∗
αϵ
1−αϵ (LA)
1
1−αϵ
α
a
(1 − τ∗)τ∗ αϵ1−αϵ Γ(β) 11−αϵ β − 1
β
. (30)
From equations (28) to (30), we can see that the patent parameter β is included
only in (30). This result implies that stronger patent protection (i.e., the broader
patent breadth β) affects the balanced-growth maximizing public investment pol-
icy (τ∗, λ∗) only though its effect on the balanced-growth rate g∗.
Conditions (28) and (29) are consistent with those found in Kalaitzidakis and
Kalyvitis (2004). Let us first explain the condition (28). Condition (28) indicates
that as long as the government engages in maintenance activities of public capital,
the balanced-growth maximizing income tax rate τ∗ is greater than the elasticity of
public capital in the output production function αϵ. Consequently, the balanced-
growth maximizing income tax rate τ∗ is positively (resp., negatively) related to
the balanced-growth maximizing expenditure share of maintenance activities 1 −
λ∗ (resp., new investment λ∗).
Let us next explain the condition (29). Since g∗+δ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) = λ∗τ∗Γ(β)ALx∗αϵ−1
from (20), equation (29) can be rewritten as
−δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) = Γ(β)ALx∗αϵ−1. (29’)
As depicted in Figure 3, the condition (29’) indicates that the balanced-growth
maximizing public investment policy (λ∗, τ∗) is determined so that the marginal
expenditures of new investment and maintenance have the same contribution to
public capital accumulation.
4.2 Effects of Patent Protection
In this subsection, we examine the effect of patent protection on the balanced-
growth maximizing public investment policy described in the previous subsection.
Using equations (28) to (30), we obtain
dλ∗ = −αϵ + (1 − αϵ)λ
∗
τ∗(1 − αϵ) dτ
∗, (31)
dg∗ = −
[
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + (1 − τ
∗)αϵδ′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
(1 − αϵ)2
]
dτ∗, (32)
[
σ
σg∗ + ρ
+
αϵ
1 − αϵ
1
g∗ + δ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
]
dg∗ =
{
β(1 − α)[1 − αβ + α + α(1 − ϵ)] + α2(1 − ϵ)
(β − 1)β[β(1 − α) + α](1 − αϵ)
}
dβ
(33)
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The deviation of equations (31) to (33) is shown in Appendix B. Appendix C
shows that the second-order sufficient condition for g∗ to be a relative maximum
is satisfied when
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + αϵ(1 − τ
∗)δ′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
(1 − αϵ)2 > 0,
⇔ −δ
′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) (1 − λ∗)τ∗
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) >
(1 − αϵ)2(1 − λ∗)τ∗
αϵ(1 − τ∗) .
(34)
The sufficient condition for g∗ to be a relative maximum requires that the elasticity
of the change in the public capital depreciation rate with respect to the share of
maintenance expenditure to final output be large enough to satisfy (34).16 Here-
after, we restrict our analysis to the parameter regions that ensure that the condi-
tion (34) holds. Under the condition of (34), from equations (31) to (33), we can
obtain the effect of patent protection on the balanced-growth maximizing public
investment policy (τ∗, λ∗) and the associated balanced-growth rate g∗ as follows.
dτ∗
dβ
= −
β(1−α)[1−αβ+α+α(1−ϵ)]+α2(1−ϵ)
(β−1)β[β(1−α)+α](1−αϵ)[
σ
σg+ρ +
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g∗+δ((1−λ∗)τ∗)
] [
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + (1−τ∗)αϵδ′′((1−λ∗)τ∗)(1−αϵ)2
] < 0, (35)
dλ∗
dβ
= −αϵ + (1 − αϵ)λ
∗
τ∗(1 − αϵ)
dτ∗
dβ
> 0, (36)
dg∗
dβ
=
β(1−α)[1−αβ+α+α(1−ϵ)]+α2(1−ϵ)
(β−1)β[β(1−α)+α](1−αϵ)
σ
σg∗+ρ +
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g∗+δ((1−λ∗)τ∗)
> 0, (37)
where (35) is obtained from (32) and (33); (36) is obtained from (31) and (35);
(37) is obtained from (33), respectively. Thus, we can obtain the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 3 Under condition (34), the following statements hold.
(1). If patent protection is stronger, the balanced-growth maximizing expendi-
ture share of new investment is higher, whereas the balanced-growth maxi-
mizing income tax rate is lower.
(2). Both with and without balanced-growth maximizing public investment pol-
icy, stronger patent protection enhances economic growth. The balanced-
growth maximizing public investment policy always strengthens the direct
growth-enhancing effect of patent protection.
16Analogous parameter conditions are briefly discussed in Yakita (2008).
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In order to understand the intuition behind the results of Proposition 3, we first
consider the effect of patent protection β on the steady-state public capital/number
of intermediate goods ratio x∗ under the balanced-growth maximizing public in-
vestment policy. Using (20’), (28), (29) and (32), we obtain the effect of β on x∗
under the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy as follows:
1
x∗
dx∗
dβ
=
1
(1 − αϵ)

 1λ∗τ∗ + δ
′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + αϵ(1−τ∗)δ′′((1−λ∗)τ∗)(1−αϵ)2
g∗ + δ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
 dτ∗dβ − α(1 − α)(β − 1)β(1 − α) + α
 < 0
(38)
The deviation of equation (38) is shown in Appendix D.
From (38), we can see that stronger patent protection, together with the as-
sociated public investment policy changes (i.e., dτ
∗
dβ < 0 and
dλ∗
dβ > 0), lowers
the steady-state public capital/number of intermediate goods ratio. Intuitively, on
the one hand, as shown in Appendix E, given the value of τ and λ (i.e., with-
out the associated changes in public investment policy), stronger patent protection
increases the share of income that goes to monopolistic profits, enhances innova-
tions and thus negatively affects the steady-state public capital/number of inter-
mediate goods ratio (i.e., “direct effect”). On the other hand, as is inferred from
(20’), the effects of the associated public investment policy changes (i.e., dτ
∗
dβ < 0
and dλ
∗
dβ > 0) on x
∗ are generally ambiguous, because the effect of the decline in
τ∗ on x∗ and that of the rise in λ∗ on x∗ offset each other (i.e., “policy change
effect”). Consequently, the former “direct effect” dominates the latter “policy
change effect”, and the stronger patent protection, together with the associated
public investment policy changes, lowers the steady-state public capital/number
of intermediate goods ratio.
Let us next explain the intuition behind the results of Proposition 3-1 (i.e.,
dλ∗
dβ > 0 and
dτ∗
dβ < 0). We first consider the result shown in (36) (i.e.,
dλ∗
dβ > 0).
From (29’), the optimal expenditure share of new investment λ∗ is determined
so that the marginal expenditures of new investment and maintenance make the
same contribution to public capital accumulation. From Figure 3, since Γ′(β) < 0
and dτ
∗
dβ < 0 from (35), stronger patent protection and the associated decrease
in tax rate shifts the Γ(β)ALx∗αϵ−1 line downward and −δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) curve up-
ward. These effects negatively affect the balanced-growth maximizing expendi-
ture share of new investment (i.e., “direct effect” and “tax change effect”). How-
ever, since dx
∗
dβ < 0 from (38), the associated decrease in the steady-state public
capital/number of intermediate goods ratio shifts the Γ(β)ALx∗αϵ−1 line upward.
This effect positively affects the balanced-growth maximizing expenditure share
of new investment (i.e., “public capital effect”). The result shown in (36) (i.e.,
dλ∗
dβ > 0) indicates that the latter “public capital effect” dominates the former “di-
rect effect” and “tax change effect”. Consequently, stronger patent protection, to-
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gether with the associated public investment policy changes, eventually shift the
Γ(β)ALx∗αϵ−1 upward, as described in Figure 3, and increases the balanced-growth
maximizing expenditure share of new investment.
Next, we consider the result shown in (35) (i.e., dτ
∗
dβ < 0). From (28), the
balanced-growth maximizing income tax rate τ∗ is negatively related to the balanced-
growth maximizing expenditure share of new investment λ∗. As shown in (36),
stronger patent protection increases the balanced-growth maximizing expenditure
share of new investment. Therefore, from (28) and (36), stronger patent protec-
tion, together with the associated increase in expenditure share of new investment,
lowers the balanced-growth maximizing income tax rate.
Lastly, let us explain the intuition behind the results of Proposition 3-2. From
(37), we can see that the stronger patent protection, together with the associated
public investment policy changes (i.e., dτ
∗
dβ < 0 and
dλ∗
dβ > 0), increase the balanced-
growth rate. Moreover, as shown in Appendix E, even if the values of τ and λ are
held constant (i.e., without the associated changes in public investment policy),
stronger patent protection increases the balanced growth rate. Note that under
the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy, fiscal instruments τ
and λ are adjusted to maximize the balanced-growth rate for each value of β.
Consequently, the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy always
strengthens the direct growth-enhancing effect of patent protection.
The solid lines in Figures 4-1 to 4-3 show the numerical examples of the re-
lationship between patent protection β and the expenditure share of new invest-
ment λ∗ (Figure 4-1), the income tax rate τ∗ (Figure 4-2) and the balanced-growth
rate g∗ (Figure 4-3) under the balanced-growth maximizing public investment
policy, whereas the dashed line in Figure 4-3 shows the balanced-growth rate
g f ix that is achieved when λ and τ are held constant at their fixed values (i.e.,
λ = λ f ix = 0.8004 and τ = τ f ix = 0.2380). As shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2, the
relations λ∗ = λ f ix and τ∗ = τ f ix hold only when β = 0.3. Since the quantitative
impact of public investment policy changes (i.e., dλ
∗
dβ > 0 and
dτ∗
dβ < 0) on economic
growth is relatively small in our baseline simulation, the difference between g∗ and
g f ix is invisible in Figure 4-3. Therefore, Figure 4-4 shows the difference between
g∗ and g f ix for several different values of β ∈ [1.15, 1.45]. To parameterize the
model, we need to specify the functional form of the depreciation rate of public
capital. Following Yakita (2008), we assume that δ
(
IM,t
Yt
)
= H
[
1 − ( IM,tYt )η
]
, where
H > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1). The parameter values used to derive the results of Figures
4-1 to 4-4 are summarized in Table 1, and explanations of these parameter values
are provided in Appendix F. 17
17These numerical examples satisfy both conditions of (24) and (34). The objective of this nu-
merical analysis is not to calibrate our simple model to actual data but to supplement the quantita-
tive results of Proposition 3. Although we chose the parameter values carefully, these quantitative
results should be interpreted with caution.
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As shown in Figures 4-1 to 4-3, as patent protection becomes stronger (i.e., as
patent breadth β increases), the balanced-growth maximizing expenditure share
of new investment is higher (Figure 4-1) and the balanced-growth maximizing
income tax rate is lower (Figure 4-2). In addition, both with and without balanced-
growth maximizing public investment policy, stronger patent protection increases
the balanced growth rate (Figure 4-3). These numerical simulation results are
consistent with the results obtained in Propositions 3-1 and 3-2. Moreover, Figure
4-4 shows that the relation g∗ − g f ix ≥ 0 holds for β ∈ [1.15, 1.45] implying that
the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy always strengthens the
direct growth enhancing effect of stronger patent protection. Therefore, Figure
4-4 confirms the second statement of Proposition 3-2.
5 Welfare Maximizing Public Investment Policy
In this section, we consider the welfare-maximizing public investment policy
along the balanced-growth path (BGP). As shown in Appendix G, the lifetime
utility of a representative household along the BGP is expressed as
U =
L
1 − σ
[
c1−σ0
ρ − g(1 − σ) −
1
ρ
]
. (39)
where
c0 =
aN0
L
(σ − β−1
β
α)g + ρ
β−1
β
α
, (40)
Here, c0 is the initial per capita consumption. For c0 > 0, the relation [σ− β−1β α]g+
ρ > 0 must hold. Equations (39) and (40) indicate that public investment policy
(τ, λ) affects the lifetime utility of a representative household along the BGP only
through its effect on the balanced-growth rate g. Thus, by differentiating (39) with
respect to g, we obtain
∂U
∂g
= Lc1−σ0
[
(σ − β−1
β
α)g + ρ
]
σ + ρ(1 − β−1
β
α)[
(σ − β−1
β
α)g + ρ
]
[ρ − g(1 − σ)]2
> 0. (41)
As shown in Appendix H, the transversality condition ensures that the relations
ρ− g(1−σ) > 0 and [σ− β−1
β
α]g+ ρ > 0 hold. From (41), the lifetime utility of a
representative household along the BGP is monotonically increasing in g, which
implies that the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy is also the
welfare maximizing public investment policy along the BGP. Thus, we obtain the
following proposition:
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Proposition 4 The balanced-growth growth maximizing public investment pol-
icy is equivalent to the welfare maximizing public investment policy along the
balanced-growth path.
Proposition 4 relies on the assumption that the economy always rides on the
balanced-growth path. However, if we explicitly consider the transitional process
to balanced-growth equilibrium, the balanced-growth growth maximizing public
investment policy does not necessarily equal the welfare maximizing public in-
vestment policy (e.g., Futagami et al, 1993; Turnovsky, 1997). Unfortunately, we
have not yet obtained any new policy implications from the analysis of the welfare
maximizing public investment policy with explicit considerations of the transition
process. Therefore the complete analysis of the welfare maximizing public in-
vestment policy with explicit considerations of the transition process may be a
promising direction for future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy
in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are private R&D and
public capital accumulation. In the model, the government allocates tax revenue
between new investment and maintenance expenditure for public capital. Then,
we considered how the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy
changes as patent protection becomes stronger, as seen in many countries. The
results showed that as patent protection becomes stronger, the income tax rate to
finance public investment should be lower and the expenditure share of new in-
vestment should be higher. That is, the balanced-growth maximizing policy leads
to a smaller government, as patent protection becomes stronger.
18
Appendix
Appendix A
By totally differentiating (23) with respect to λ, τ and β, we obtain[
σ
σg + ρ
+
αϵ
1 − αϵ
1
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
]
dg =
αϵ
1 − αϵ
[
1
λ
+
δ′ ((1 − λ)τ) τ
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
]
dλ
+
{
αϵ
1 − αϵ
[
1
τ
− δ
′ ((1 − λ)τ) (1 − λ)
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
]
− 1
1 − τ
}
dτ
+
{
β(1 − α)[1 − αβ + α + α(1 − ϵ)] + α2(1 − ϵ)
(β − 1)β[β(1 − α) + α](1 − αϵ)
}
dβ
(A.1)
The above equation yields (26) and (27) immediately.
Appendix B
By totally differentiating (28) with respect to λ and τ, we obtain (31). Analo-
gously, by totally differentiating (29) with respect to λ and τ, and rearranging it
using (31), we obtain (32). Moreover, by substituting (26) and (27) into (A.1), we
obtain (33).
Appendix C
From (26) and (27), the Hessian matrix of second-order derivatives is defined as
follows:
H ≡
g∗λλ g∗λτg∗τλ g∗λλ
 , (A.2)
where
g∗λλ ≡ gλλ(τ∗, λ∗) = −∆τ2δ′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) < 0,
g∗λτ ≡ gλτ(τ∗, λ∗) = ∆
[
(1 − αϵ)τ
αϵ(1 − τ∗)δ
′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + τ
∗ − αϵ
1 − αϵ δ
′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
]
,
g∗ττ ≡ gττ(τ∗, λ∗) = ∆
 2αϵ − ταϵτ∗(1 − τ∗)δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) −
[
τ∗ − αϵ
(1 − αϵ)τ∗
]2
δ′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
 < 0,
19
g∗λτ = g
∗
τλ and ∆ ≡
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g+δ((1−λ∗)τ∗)
σ
σg∗+ρ+
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g∗+δ((1−λ∗)τ∗)
> 0. Moreover, we obtain
g∗λλg
∗
ττ−g∗λτg∗τλ = −∆2
τ∗2δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) (1 − αϵ)2
[αϵ(1 − τ∗)]2
[
δ′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗) + αϵ(1 − τ
∗)δ′′ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)
(1 − αϵ)2
]
.
(A.3)
The second-order sufficient condition for g(λ∗, τ∗; β) to be a relative maximum is
given by g∗λλ < 0 and g
∗
λλg
∗
ττ−g∗λτg∗τλ > 0. From (A.3), the relation g∗λλg∗ττ−g∗λτg∗τλ >
0 holds when the condition (34) is satisfied.
Appendix D
By totally differentiating (20’) with respect to λ, τ and β, we obtain
dx
x
= − 1
(1 − αϵ)[g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)]dg +
1
τ(1 − αϵ)
[
1 − τ(1 − λ)δ
′ ((1 − λ)τ)
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
]
dτ
+
1
λ(1 − αϵ)
[
1 +
λτδ′ ((1 − λ)τ)
g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)
]
dλ − 1
1 − αϵ
α(1 − α)(β − 1)
β(1 − α) + α dβ.
(A.4)
Substituting (28) and (29) into (A.4) yields
dx∗
x∗
= − 1
(1 − αϵ)[g∗ + δ ((1 − λ∗)τ∗)]dg
∗ +
1
τ∗(1 − αϵ)λ∗dτ
∗
− 1
1 − αϵ
α(1 − α)(β − 1)
β(1 − α) + α dβ.
(A.5)
By substituting (32) into (A.5), and rearranging them, we obtain (38).
Appendix E
Given the value of τ and λ (i.e., dτ = dλ = 0), from (A.1) and (A.4), we obtain
dg
dβ
=
β(1−α)[1−αβ+α+α(1−ϵ)]+α2(1−ϵ)
(β−1)β[β(1−α)+α](1−αϵ)
σ
σg+ρ +
αϵ
1−αϵ
1
g+δ((1−λ)τ)
> 0, (A.6)
1
x
dx
dβ
= − 1
(1 − αϵ)[g + δ ((1 − λ)τ)]
dg
dβ
− 1
1 − αϵ
α(1 − α)(β − 1)
β(1 − α) + α < 0. (A.7)
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Appendix F
We set the discount rate (ρ) to 0.02 and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (σ) to 1.5 according to Jones et al. (1993). The value of labor size (L)
and the unit cost of R&D (a) are normalized to 1.
According to international evidence (Britton et al., 2000; Gali et al., 2007), the
markup estimates in developed countries range from 1.2 to 1.4. Based on these
estimates, we set the share of intermediate goods inputs in output (α) to 2/3 so
that the highest markup rate ( 1
α
) is given by 1.5. We also set the patent breadth
parameter (β) to 1.3 in the baseline simulation, and changed it from 1.15 to 1.45.
The empirical estimates of output elasticity of infrastructure vary substantially
among existing studies. However, recent empirical studies indicate that the output
elasticity of infrastructure lies in the 0.1-0.2 range on average (e.g., Shioji, 2001;
Kamps, 2006; Bom and Ligthart, 2014). In particular, the meta-regression anal-
ysis by Bom and Ligthart (2014) finds that the long-run output elasticity of core
infrastructure at the regional/local level of government is 0.193. Based on these
estimates, we set the weight parameter of the externality effect from the public
capital (ϵ) to 0.3 so that the output elasticity of public capital (αϵ) is given by 0.2.
Published data on maintenance are very scarce, due to inherent problems in
the measurement of this type of expenditures. To the best of our knowledge,
there has been only one source of long-term data on maintenance expenditures,
namely, the Canadian survey on Capital and Repair Expenditures. Using this
dataset, Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005) find that 21% of total public capital
spending went toward maintenance and repair expenditures. Based on this finding,
we set the scaling parameter of the depreciation rate function (H) to 0.62, and
the elasticity parameter of the depreciation rate function (η) to 0.1 so that the
expenditure share of new investment in the baseline simulation is approximately
given by 0.8. Furthermore, to achieve a 2% balanced growth rate in the baseline
simulation, we adjust the productivity parameter in the final goods production
sector (A) to 0.955.
Appendix G
On the balanced-growth path, per capita consumption ct grows at a rate g with its
time path given by ct = c0egt. By substituting ct = c0egt into (1) and rearranging
them, we obtain (39). Noting that c˙tct =
N˙t
Nt
= g and x = GtNt , from (18) and (19), we
obtain
c0 =
[
(1 − τ)Γ(β)Axαϵ − a
L
g
]
N0, (A.8)
(1 − τ)Γ(β)Axαϵ = a
L
1
β−1
β
α
(σg + ρ). (A.9)
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By substituting (A.9) into (A.8), and rearranging them, we obtain (40).
Appendix H
Substituting (11) into asset market clearing condition yields At = aNt. Hence,
on the balanced-growth path, the real value of asset At grows at a rate g with its
time path given by At = A0egt. By substituting At = A0egt, ct = c0egt into the
transversality condition, we obtain
lim
t→∞ c
−σ
0 A0e
−[ρ−(1−σ)g]t = 0, (A.10)
which implies that the relation ρ − (1 − σ)g > 0 must hold. Since β−1
β
α < 1, we
obtain the following relationship:
0 < ρ − (1 − σ)g
< ρ − (β − 1
β
α − σ)g = [σ − β − 1
β
α]g + ρ.
Therefore, the transversality condition ensures that the relations ρ − g(1 − σ) > 0
and [σ − β−1
β
α]g + ρ > 0 hold.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
ρ Discount rate 0.02
σ The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1.5
L Labor size 1
a A unit cost of R&D 1
α The share of intermediate goods inputs in output 2/3
β The strength of patent protection 1.3 (1.05-1.45)
ϵ The weight parameter of the externality effect from the public capital 0.3
H The scaling parameter of the depreciation rate function 0.62
η The elasticity parameter of the depreciation rate function 0.1
A The productivity parameter of the final good production 0.955
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Figure 1: Index of patent rights 1960-2005 in G7 countries
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Figure 2: The GDP share of general government gross fixed capital formation
1980-2010 in G7 countries
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Figure 4: Patent protection and growth maximizing public investment policy
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